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LABOR LAW ADMINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA.
I.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGENCIES FOR ADMINIS-
TERING LABOR LEGISLATION IN PENNSYLVA-
NIA.
I. EARLY LEGISLATION.
The earliest laws for !he protection of labor in Pennsylva-
nia, as in other states, failed to provide for any enforcing author-
ity. They went on the theory that the aggrieved workman or
some benevolent person interested in the worker's welfare would
prosecute the employer, and thus justice would be done.
Some of the early child-labor legislation is typical. We are
not interested here so much in the provisions of these laws, which
in general prohibited the employment of minors under the age of
thirteen in certain industries and limited the hours of labor for
minors in certain cases, as we are concerned about the means of
enforcement.
The Act of x18481 provided a penalty of fifty dollars for
violation of the act, one-half to the person illegally employed and
one-half to the State, "to be recovered in like manner as fines of
like amount are now recoverable by law." This meant that
someone would have to institute proceedings against the em-
ployer for violation of the statute, but the workman was afraid
and there were very few philanthropists who were interested
enough to start things, so it is evident that the law accomplished
little.
The Act of 1849 2 provided that any owner or employer who
knowingly or wilfully employs any minor below the age of
thirteen, shall pay a penalty of fifty dollars for each offense, to
be sued for and recovered by any person suing for the same, one-
half to go to the person suing and one-half to the county in which
'Pennsylvania Statutes, 1848, P. L. 2&
'Pa. Statutes, 1849, P. L. 67z.
(27b)
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the offense was committed. The Act of 1855 3 provided for a
penalty of from ten to fifty dollars, recoverable before any alder-
man or justice of the peace, to be applied to the use of the public
schools. A commentator says: "No provision was made for the
enforcement of this act, the Legislature having been unwilling to
permit constables to proceed in the absence of complaints by pri-
vate citizens, and it remained practically a dead letter for some
thirty-five years."'
Another example of ineffectual law-making is an Act of
i8877 providing generally for the semi-monthly payment of
wage workers. This act contained no provision of any kind for
its enforcement and remained inoperative until passage of an
amendatory act in i89i,6 which made it a misdemeanor for any
person to refuse to make payment of wages "when demanded" at
certain specified periods. This act made it the duty of the factory
inspector to bring action under its provisions, upon the request of
any citizen, also authorizing any citizen to bring such action on'
failure of the factory inspector to do so.? In an opinion of the
Attorney General of Pennsylvania to the Factory Inspector, he
said: "You are not required to institute such actions indiscrimi-
nately and literally upon the request of any citizens of this Com-
monwealth. It is your right and duty to investigate complaints
and requests made to you and to ascertain that they are well-
founded and made in good faith before you comply with them."'
This matter of law enforcement in the United States during
the nineteenth century is very effectively analyzed by Dean Roscoe
Pound, in the following words:
"The Anglo-American started out to leave to the courts what in
other lands was committed to administration and inspection and ex-
ecutive supervision. He was averse to inspection and supervision in
advance of action, preferring to show the individual his duty by a
'Pa. Statutes, 1855, P. 1. 472.
'Brinton, Labor Laws of Pennsylvania (1917), P. 351.
*Pa. Statutes, x88-, P. L. L=.
4 Pa. Statutes, i8gr, P. L 96.
'The importance of having an independent enforcing authority, as the
factory inspector, is considered later.
'Report of Factory Inspector, 94, p. s.
LABOR LAW ADMINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 279
general law, to leave him free to act according to his judgment, and to
prosecute him and impose the predetermined penalty in case his free
action infringed the law. This attempt to confine administrative
action to the inevitable minimum, which originally was fundamental
in our polity, resulted in the nineteenth century in a multitude of
rules which hindered as against few which helped. Regulation of
public utilities, factory inspection, food inspection, tenement-house
inspection, and building laws are compelling us to turn, more and
more from the criminal law to administrative prevention."'
The firm hold which this laissez-faire individualism had dur-
ing the nineteenth century is well shown by the fact that the
workers, who were most affected by failure of ihe labor law to
serve its stated purposes, presented no organized demands for
government enforcement.
2. BuREAu OP LABOR STATISTiCS.
Instead of demanding government enforcement, appeals were
made for bureaus of investigation. Such a bureau was first cre-
ated in Massachusetts in 1869. Pennsylvania followed in ]872
by the creation of a Bureau of Statistics on Labor which was
established in 1874,10 as ihe Bureau of Industrial Statistics un-
der the Secretary of the Interior, with power to investigate in-
dustrial conditions, summon and subpcena witnesses, etc., and to
file reports, which, incidentally, seems to have been about all that
was done. When the Department of Labor and Industry was-or-
ganized in 1913, a Bureau of Statistics and Information was cre-
ated in the department."1 The Legislature in i919 transferred
this Bureau of Statistics and Information from the Department
of Labor and Industry to the Department of Internal Affairs,12
where it absorbed the old Bureau of Industrial Statistics. It seems
'Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern. City. 26
Harvard Law Review 32.
"Pa. Statutes, x874, P. L. 13S, sec. 4.
"Pa. Statutes, 1913, P. L 396, sec. IL
"P2. Statutes, xgig,. P. L 80. This repeals see. xix of the Act of i91i
P. L 3966
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that this decentralization is advisable because the business of gath-
ering statistics is entirely distinct from enforcing the labor law,
and when carried out under a single authority causes an interfer-
ence of one function with another. Experience has proved that
inspectors are often more anxious to secure the information de-
sired by the statisticians of the Labor Department than to see
that the labor law is enforced.12
The futility of protective statutes without effective pro-
visions for their enforcement became increasingly evident, and
the arm of the State was at last called upon as the enforcing au-
thority. For instance, factory inspection started in Massachu-
setts as a function of the police officers. Later when it was dis-
covered that the phase of factory life dealing with health was be-
ing neglected, a small body of inspectors started to work under
the State Board of Health. Finally a Board of Factory Inspec-
tion was formed to take over the functions of these two sets of
inspectors.
14
.3. DEPARTMENT OF FACTORY INSPECTION.
In Pennsylvania, the office of factory inspector was first
established by the Factory Act of 1889,5 which made provision
for the appointment by the Governor of a Factory Inspector, to
serve for three years at a salary of fifteen hundred dollars a year,
and who was authorized to appoint not exceeding six deputies at
one thousand dollars a year, one-half to be women. In various
Factory Acts passed subsequently the number of inspectors and
their salaries have been steadily increased, until today there are
over one hundred inspectors and a large office force. In x9o5,1'
the Department of Factory Inspection was created. The duties
of this department, as provided by the Factory Act of igo 5 , in-
cluded the licensing and regulation of tenement work, the inspec-
tion and regulation of bakeries, and of all factories where women
s aKingsbury, Labor Laws and their Enforcement, 259.
"3 American Labor Legislation Review 34.
"Pa. Statutes, 1889. P. L 2.
Pa. Statutes, i9o$, P. L. 352, known as the Factory Act of xgo..
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and minors are employed, and the enforcement of the laws con-
cerning fire escapes, ventilation, wash-rooms, etc., in factories.
All of this earlier legislation is detailed and cumbersome,
covering all conceivable conditions of employment by fixed rules.
In a study of the Labor Law of Maryland, Mr. Lauchheimer
says:
"Before i91o, all safety and sanitary laws, if complete, were
lengthy and minute enactments, covering every known condition of
employment and laying down absolute laws to apply to every pre-
conceived condition. Set screws, unguarded belts and other danger-
ous devices were outlawed, but there the law stopped: In 191x , Wis-
consin applied the commission idea of regulation to industrial condi-
tions. A general law providing for safety in industral occupations
was enacted and a commission with ordinance powers was appointed
to issue orders in compliance with this general law.""
In discussing the Wisconsin idea, Mr. John R. Commons
* says: "Instead of specifying the many details of factory inspec-
tion, the Legislature boiled them down into one paragraph, requir-
ing the employer to protect the life, safety, health and welfare of
employees and authorizing the Commission to draw up rules and
orders specifying the details as to how it is to be done.",$
This was the beginning of a movement toward the unifica-
tion of the various .agencies of labor law enforcement. The need
for unification is evident when we realize the diverse agencies
which were trying to enforce the labor law. In Pennsylvania,
there were local boards of all kinds, as Fire Commissioners,
County Commissioners, School Boards, Health Boards, Public
• Safety Departments, local police and local boiler inspectors, be-
sides the State inspectors. Some of these boards still -function,
but their work is co-ordinated in the Department of Labor and
Industry, and, instead of being independent administrative agen-
cies of the labor law, they are now only outside helpers of the De-
partment of Labor and Industry.
"Malcolm H. Lauchheimer, Labor Law of Maryland, p. 77.
'John R. Commons, Labor and Administration, Chapter 22.
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II.
THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY OF PENNSYL-
VANIA.
Pennsylvania did not follow the Wisconsin plan, but instead
concentrated all responsibility for the enforcement of the Labor
Law in one executive, the Commissioner of Labor and Industry,
and created a separate body with ordinance-making powers, the
Industrial Board. The 1921 Session of the New York Legis-
lature has worked out a plan to supplant the Industrial Commis-
sion, as now organized in New York, which is modeled after the
Wisconsin idea, by a Department of Labor organized in accord
with the Pennsylvania idea. This law was approved on March 9,
1921, and establishes an Industrial Commissioner as-the executive
head of the Department of Labor, instead of the former Indus-
trial Commission, and also creates an Industrial Board with the
powers of a Workmen's Compensation Board and additional
ordinance-making powers."'
The Department of Labor and Industry was established in
Pennsylvania by the Act of 1913,;20 Section 14 of which lays
docwn a general standard, as follows:
"All rooms, buildings and places in this Commonwealth where
labor is employed, or shall hereafter be employed, shall be so con-
structed, equipped, and arranged, operated and conducted, in all re-
spects, as to provide reasonable and adequate protection for the life,
health, safety and morals of all persons employed therein."
The enforcement of this general standard is entrusted to the
Commissioner of Labor and Industry, who is also made respon-
sible for all the statutes concerning labor, as the ChildLabor"
Act,2 1 the Woman's Act,
22 the Workmen's Compensation Act,
23
and all the factory acts whicli were previously enforced by the
"New York, Laws ig22, Chapter so (Labor Law), repealing Chapter
31, Consolidated Laws.
" Pa.' Statutes, 2923, P. 1. 396
Pa. Statutes, i915, P. L 28&
Pa. Statutes, 1913, P. L 1024.
n Pa. Statutes, 2925, P. L 736.
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Department of Factory Inspection, whose powers and duties are
now vested in and imposed upon the Department of Labor and
Industry.
As constituted at present, this department is headed by a
Commissioner of Labor and Industry at a salary of ten thousand
dollars, who is appointed by the Governor with the consent of the
Senate.24 The department organization includes: an Industrial
Board, a Workmen's Compensation Board, a Bureau of Inspec-
tion, a Division of Hygiene and Engineering, a Bureau of Media-
tion and Arbitration, a Bureau of Employment and a Bureau of
Rehabilitation. The Commissioner of Labor and Industry is em-
powered to appoint the officers named in the Law, except the In-
dustrial and Workmen's Compensation Boards. He may appoint
a general office'force and such experts and other employees as he
may deem necessary. He is further empowered to have these va-
xious officers carry out the purpose of the department unde-7 his
direction and supervision. Some of the departments mentioned, as
the Bureau of Mediation and Arbitration and the Bureau of Re-
habilitation, are comparatively new, and their work involves im-
portant social rather than legal considerations. The administra-
tion of Workmen's Compensation is too large a subject to be
taken up in this discussion, which will be consequently limited to
the consideration of the Bureau of Inspection and of the Indus-
trial Board.
IIL
INSPECTION.
Section 8 of the Act of I913,3 -creating the Department of
Labor and Industry, provides:
"The Commissioner of Labor and Industry shall visit and in-
spect, or cause to be visited and inspected, during reasonable hours
and as often as practicable, every room, building or place, where and
when any labor is being performed which is affected by the prowsions
of any law of this commonwealth or of this act, and shall cause to
be enforced therein the provisions of all such existing laws at-i of
this act, and the rules and regulations of the industrial Board herein-
after provided for."
"Pa. Statutes, 1913, P. L. 396, see. r.
" Pa. Statutes, 1913, P. L 396.
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Among the existing laws to be thus enforced are the Child
Labor Act,26 the Woman's Act,2? and the sections of Factory Act'
of 1905,28 which are still in force.
Sections 17'and I8 of the said Factory Act provide in a gen-
eral way that bake-shops shall be kept in a clean and sanitary
condition and that all bake-shops must obtain permits or certifi-
cates from the department (now the Department of Labor and
Industry), certifying that the law has been complied with, before
they are permitted to go ahead and manufacture breadstuffs.
Upon the giving of a written notice to comply with the law within
ten days, the department may revoke a permit already issued, if,
after a hearing, the notice is not obeyed, and thus compel the dos-
ing of a bake-shop which is not maintained in a clean and sanitary
condition. Sections i5 and 16 of this Factory Act provide for
the regulation of "sweat-shops' in somewhat similar terms. The
Industrial -Board formulated a Bake-Shop Code which bebame
operative in 1916 and carries out in considerable detail the pro-
visions given by the Factory Act in outline.2 '
The provisions of the Woman's Act 30 in regard to enforce-
ment alone cover about four pages of the statute, which shows
the extent to which enforcement is emphasized at present. It is
provided that official abstracts of the act and a schedule of the
hours of labor shall be posted in the room where any female is
employed under the terms of the act. The employer is bound to
have a record giving satisfactory proof that females employed at
night work are over the age of twenty-one. Inspection can be
made at any hour. The Commissioner of Labor and Industry
and his deputies, the inspectors, are authorized to instigate prose-
Pa. Statutes, i9is, P. L. 28&
MPa. Statutes, 1913, P. L 3o24.
, Pa. Statutes, r9o$, P. L. 35z
-The Pennsylvania Legislature by Act 'No. 325 of the i919 Session (ap-
proved July 9, x919) has practically taken the Bake-Shop Code of the In-
dustrial Board and incorporated it into a Statute along the same general lines
as Sections 17-18 of the Factory Act, with the result that many details of
administration are now in statutory form. The Department of Labor and In-
dustry still has authority to formulate new rules as they may be needed for
enforcing the Statute, to issue and revoke permits, and, in general, to see
that the law is enforced and violations punished.
0 Pa. Statutes, x913, P. L z024.
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cutions for violations of the act, and summary proceedings be.
fore a magistrate or justice of the peace are provided for, with a
right of appeal to a court of proper jurisdiction within twenty
days after the imposition of the penalty fixed by the act.
Another of the existing laws to be enforced by the Depart-
ment of Labor and Industry is the Fire and Panic Act of x9o9,31
which provides that all buildings in which persons are employed
above the second story, shall be provided with proper ways of
egress or means of escape from fire; further that such build-
ings shall have one or more fire escapes as may be directed by the
Factory Inspector, and that the said inspector may issue a certifi-
cate to the owner or lessee of said building if he deems that such
fire escapes are unnecessary, in consequence of adequate provision
having been made for safety. The penalty for failure to comply
with the provisions of the act or to observe the orders of the Fac-
tory Inspector (i. e., official orders) is that the owners of such
buildings shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by
fine of $5oo or six months' imprisonment or both.
In the case upholding the constitutionality of this act, Elkin,
J., said:"
"It is true the act might be enforced in such an arbitrary manner
as to work hardship and do* great injustice in some instances, but
nothing of this kind appears in the present case. It will be presumed
that officers entrusted with its enforcement will only require such
reasonable compliance as the exigencies of each particular case de-
mand. The act should be enforced in a spirit not to destroy the use-
fulness of property or to place undue burdens upon the owner, but
only as a protection to such an extent as may be required in view of
the situation of the building, having due regards to the use made of
it. When so enforced, there can be no valid objection on the ground
of its requirements being unreasonable, That it will be so enforced
may be presumed."
Such a liberal interpretation of the statute is of immense value to
the department entrusted with its enforcement, and the wisdom
of the court in refusing to tie the hands of the administrative
agency cannot be doubted.
' Pa. Statutes, xo9, P. L 417.
"Roumfort Company v. Delaney, 230 Pa. 377 o9ii).
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The following language of the Attorney General of Pennsyl-
vania, in advising the Factory Inspector under the provisions of
an act 33 providing that means of egress should be "sufficient," is
still applicable to the labor laws mentioned herein:
"What is or is not 'sufficient' means of egress in case of fire, what
is 'dangerous' to employees, what are 'sufficient'guards and protec-
tion, or what is 'proper diligence' under the act, must in the first in-
stance, be determined by you or your deputy, and should differences
exist between you and those to whom you give notice, and from whom
you make requirements of observance of these statutes, I am of opin-
ion that the questions of sufficiency, etc., would eventually have to
be decided by a jury in the prosecution of the parties for a misde-
meanor."
31'
When raised in civil actions, questions of "dangerous" ma-
chinery, "sufficient" guards and protection, etc., have been held to
be questions of fact to be found independently by the jury. The
court thus outlines the position of the Factory Inspector in rela-
tion to the employer and owner:'
"The approval or disapproval of the Factory Inspector is not the
test of the owner's liability in such cases. . . . Where an employee
is injured by reason of the failure of his employer to properly guard
exposed machinery, the negligence consists of the disobedience of the
employer, and not of the factory inspector, to comply with the statut-
ory requirement. . . . It follows, therefore, that the approval of a
guard in any case by a factory inspector is not conclusive as to
whether the machinery is properly guarded with the meaning of the
statute. The duty rests upon the owner of the establishment, and,
when the question is raised, it can only be determined by a jury as
any other question of fact."
' Pa. Statutes, 893, P. 1- 276.
" Opinions Atty. Gen. (Pa.), i895-9 p. srs. Quoted in Brinton, Labor
Laws of Pa. (1917), P. 282.
SBooth v. Stokes, 241 Pa. 349 (xgr3). Accord: McCoy v. Wolf Comn-
pany, 235 Pa. 571 (1912).
"See-Wright v. American Dyewood Co., 25 York County Rep. x88 (Pa.).
The Court declined to permit a defendant in a civil suit "to set up the rep-
resentations of the factory inspector as final as to the propriety -of any such
guard," where an employee, (plaintiff) was injured. The language of the
Court Uudge Ross of York County) was as follows: "The law of Pennsyl-
vania does not make the factory inspectors arbiters of the propriety or safety
of any machinery used. Their powers and duties are marked out by the
act -which created their office, and further than that they cannot go, and we
believe it would be an imposition not only upon the manufacturers, but a
menace to the safey of every employee if factory inspectors were delegated
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The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Arms v. Ayer," upheld
the constitutionality of the Illinois Fire-Escapes Act of 1897,
which was attacked on the ground that it conferred legislative
power upon the Inspector of Factories in that it authorized him
to determine how many and in what position, etc., fire escapes
should be placed. The Court held that this contention was not
valid, as the law was complete in itself and the Factory Inspec-
tor was given a discretion only in the execution of it. The Court
said: , i,]
"Under the Fire-Escapes Act, the duty of equipping buildings
with fire escapes rests primarily upon the owner of the building, and
this duty and the liability consequent upon its non-performance are
not dependent upon the serving of a notice by the Inspector of Fac-
tories to erect such escapes."
The California Supreme Court has held an act providing for sani-
tation of factories unconstitutional, because it went to the other
extreme and conferred untrammeled discretion upon the admin.
istrative bodyA58
with the arbitrary power of saying what kind of machinery or guards were
perfect or proper."
In the case of Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Co, 2s Pa. 348
xgo9), a boy under 14, employed in violation of the Act of x9o5 (P. L 352)
was injured. The factory inspector had told the defendant's superintendent
that as the boy had been employed before the passage of the act, he was not
within its terms, and that he, the inspector, approved of the boy's employ-
ment. Recovery was allowed, the Court saying, "Neither factory inspector.
nor anybody else, could absolve the defendant from his statutory liability.*
It should be noted that the Court in these cases is speaking of in-
formal orders made by individual inspectors, and that the language of the
Court does not refer to official orders of the Department.
ST 192 IlL 6or (ipoz).
.Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, 135 CaL 466 (xgoz). The act in question pro-
vided that in any factory where dust and injurious gases were produced anid
liable to be inhaled, and it appears "to the Commissioner of Labor Statistics
that such inhalation could be largely prevented by the use of 'some mechanical
contrivance, he shall direct the use of such contrivance, and, within a reason-
able time, it shall be so provided and used. Petitioners in this case were
convicted of having neglected to use a suction exhauster in a metal polishing
shop, within a reasonable time after notice was given. The Court said: "The
difficulty with the present law is that it does not provide for the proper sani-
tation of factories, . . . but is an attempt to confer, upon a single per-
son, the right arbitrarily to determine not only that the sanitation of a fac-
tory is not reasonably good, but to say whether, even if reasonably good,
in his judgment, its condition may be improved by the use of such appliances
as he may delegate, and then to make a penal offense of the failure to install
such appliances. In this case it mattprc nt h - - t---- --
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There is one aspect of the enforcement of Labor Law, which
is illustrated in New York and is of sufficient importance to
warrant our consideration, although a similar situation cannot be
shown in Pennsylvania. It seems that in Pennsylvania, the De-
partment of Labor and Industry tries to get compliance with the
labor laws without prosecution, if possible, and only orders prose-
cution as a last resort. For this reason, it is understood that the
courts will respond with fines upon conviction and not suspend
sentence to give the employer a second chance to corriply s9 The
New York situation is discussed at length in the Report of the
New York Industrial Commission for 1919.40 It is shown that,
be, the proprietor is guilty of no offense until the Comfnissioner has 'required
him to use certain appliances and he has refused. The Commissiontr has
been imposed with the duty, not of enforcing a law of the legislature, but the
power to make a law for the individual and to enforce such rules of conduct
as he may prescribe. It is arbitrary, special legislation and violative of the
Constitution."
- The only material available substantiates the above statement.
According to the Report of the Commissioner of Labor and Industry of
Pa. for 1913-14 (Part 11, p. 459), there were 469 prosecutions instituted for
violation of the labor laws during 1914. There were 231 cases of violation of
the Child Labor Law; in igo cases fines were paid, i case was withdrawn, t
held for court, 4 dismissed and 35 settled by payment of costs. There were
215 cases of violation of the Female Labor Laws; in 163 cases fines were paid,
2 cases were appealed, i held for court, 3 withdrawn, 4 dismissed and 42 set-,
tled by payment of costs. There were only 16 cases of non-compliance with
instructions or orders of the Department, and in 7 of these cases, fines were
paid, I case was withdrawn, r appealed, t sentence suspended, 3 settled for
payment of costs and 3 held for court. For refusing to give. information
there were 4 cases; in 2 of them fines were paid, I was held for court and t
settled for payment of costs.
In a similar report of the Commissioner of Labor and Industry for i9i5
(part II p. 587), it is shown that there were 305 prosecutions in i95, x5 of
which were for non-compliaice with orders issued by inspectors of the De-
partment in which safeguards were ordered or sanitary conditions were not
obeyed. Of these 3o5 prosecutions, only 9 were dismissed and 3 appealed.
The report states that effort was made to avoid prosecution by obtaining strict
compliance for the future wherever possible.
The Report of 1916 (p. 47) shows that cases reported by the inspectors
are carefully gone over before prosecution is authorized, but when once
started, prosecutions are closely followed. There were 356 prosecutions in
x916.
Prosecutions are conducted by attorneys of the Attorney-General's De-
partment assigned to the Department of Labor and Industry for that pur-
pose, one of whom is a permanent counsel for labor cases.
'Annual Report of the Industrial Commission of New York xg!9, at
pages 265 to 284.
See also a survey by Samuel McCume Lindsay and John B. Andrews,
"Labor Law Administration in New York," 7 American Labor Legislation
Review 235, particularly pages 484 to 5o4.
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in general, the courts, in practice, act more like an adjunct of
the Labor Department than as separate tribunals for the admin-
istration of justice. In other words, when there is a failure of
an owner or tenant of a building to comply with orders of the
Department of Labor, requiring some alteration of the building
for sanitary or fire-protection purposes, for instance, and the
department is unable to induce compliance, the courts try a hand
at persuasion. The usual inquiry by the court when such a prose-
cution comes before it, is how long it- will take the defendant
to comply with the order, whereupon an adjournment is granted
for a part of the whole of the period to enable the defendant to
comply. One case is mentioned where there had been eleven ad-
journments, each time against the objection of counsel for the
Industrial Commission. Added to this over-readiness of the
courts to adjourn trials, is the courts' reluctance to impose penal-
ties upon conviction. This is seen in the great number of sus-
pended sentences in New York During the period of three
years investigated, the percentage of suspended sentences in
Labor law cases was from 47 to 58 per cent. in New York City
and from 69 to 75 per cent. up State. This percentage of sus-
pended sentences is all out of proportion and tends to perpetuate
the conditions sought to be remedied by the Labor Law.
The judges do not seem to be conversant with the complex
problems of administering the Labor Law, and they regard these
cases as essentially criminal proceedings, looking to the in-
dividual offender only, rather than considering the proceedings
as an important part of the machinery for enforcing the whole
body of labor law. Most defendants .are well-to-do, respectable
gentlemen, and courts tend tb be too lenient.
Due to this leniency, orders of the inspectors are often dis-
regarded because defendants know that the courts will give them
time to comply. It is worth noting that if the courts, for instance,
decide upon how much time the owner of a building used for
manufacturing purposes shall have to erect certain fire escapes,
a decision which involves questions of fire hazard and building
construction, that they substitute their opinion for that of the
administrative. body which the Legislature has created for that
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purpose. The findings of fact of the labor law administrative
body should be conclusive unless they are unreasonable. What
the courts should do in these prosecutions for violation of the
Labor Law, if the order violated is not arbitrary, is merely to
determine and punish all non-compliance with the Labor Law.
They should not substitute their discretion for that of the ad-
ministrative body in an attempt to persuade compliance with the
law.
Of course, the administration of labor law is so closely
bound up with conflicting human interests that settled conditions
are impossible. The social interest in the security of acquisitions
and transactions (the rights of property) is the interest which the
law has been in the habit of securing, and the social interest in
human life has slow progress when opposed by it. But it is urged
that labor law violations should be more strictly punished by the
courts. On occasions there may be a distinct gain involved in
giving the employer a second chance to comply, but looking at
the administration of labor law as a whole, we may say that the
work of the Department of Labor, especially by means.of inspec-
tion, loses its effectiveness, if the courts fail to sustain the reason-
able orders of the administrative body entrusted with the en-
forcement of the labor law of a state.
IV.
THE INDUSTRIAL BOARD.
I. ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES OF THE INDUSTRIAL BOARD.
The Industrial Board was created by the Act of 1913 (P. L.
396) which established the Department of Labor and Industry as
at present organized in Pennsylvania. The Industrial Board con-
sists of the Commissioner of Labor and Industry and four addi-
tional members, appointed by the Governor with the consent of
the Senate; one of whom shall be an employer of labor, one a
wage earner and one a woman. No provision is made setting
forth the requirements of the fourth member, but custom has
designated him as a representative of the public. The Commis-
sioner is chairman of the Industrial Board. The term of office
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of the members of the Board is four years, and the four addi-
tional members receive the nominal compensation of ten dollars
a day and expenses. The Board shall appoint, and may remove,
a secretary and also fix his salary, a provision which has enabled
the Board to secure the services of capable men. The Commis-
sioner shall detail to the assistance of the Industrial Board such
employees of the Department as they may require, and they may
also employ experts for special seivices. The Board holds stated
meetings, at least once a month, which shall be open to the pub-
lic, and such other meetings as may be necessary, and must keep
a record of all its proceedings.41
The functions of the Industrial Board are investigation and
regulation.42 The power of investigation is very broad and ex-
tends to "all matters touching the enforcement and effect of the
provisions of all laws of the Commonwealth, the enforcement of
which shall now and hereafter be imposed upon the Department
of Labor and Industry, and the rules and regulations made by
the Industrial Board in connection therewith." The Board may
subpoena witnesses and require the production of papers perti-
nent to the investigation, and any witness who refuses to obey
such subpoena or fails to produce papers or who is guilty of any
contempt before the Board, may be punished as for contempt of
court, and, for this purpose, application may be made to the
courts of Common Pleas of the Commonwealth.'S The investi-
gations of the Industrial Board do not involve any important
legal consequences, but their principal utility is as a basis for
formulating regulations.
The power of regulation is provided by the said Act ot
19x3, as follows:
Section r4. "All .rooms, buildings, and places in this Common-
wealth where labor is employed, or shall hereafter be employed, shall
be so constructed, equipped, and arranged, operated and conducted,
in all respects, as to provide reasonable and adequate protection for
For a complete statement, see Pa. Statutes, z913, P. L 36, sec. I2.
See a Bulletin of the Department of Labor and Industry, containing a
report of the activities of the Industrial Board. vol. VII, Series of i9o, No.
& •Pa. Statutes, 1913, P. L 396, sec. s3.
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the life, health, safety, and morals of all persons employed therein.
For the carrying into effect of this provisiou, and the provisions of
all the laws of this Commonwealth, the enforcement of which is now
or shall hereafter be entrusted to or imposed upon the Commissioner
or Department of Labor and Industry, the Industrial Board shall
have power to make, alter, amend and repeal general rules and regu-
lations necessary for applying such provisions to specific conditions,
and to prescribe means, methods, and practices to carry into effect and
enforce such provisions."
Section i5. "The rules and regulations of the Industrial Board,
and the amendments and alterations thereof, may embrace all matters
and subjects to which power and authority of the Department of
Labor and Industry extends."
Section i5 further provides for publication of every rule or
regulation adopted by the Board for thirty days before it shall
take effect. It also provides that "any employer, employee or
other person interested . . may petition for a hearing on
the reasonableness of a rule or regulation," which results in a
public hearing if the issues raised have not been adequately deter-
mined. The violation of any of the rules or regulations of the
Industrial Board is made a misdemeanor.4"
Although this extends the power of the Industrial Board
over all the labor laws of Pennsylvania under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Labor and Industry, the Legislature has en-
acted several statutes in which specific powers and duties are
conferred on the Industrial Board.
4 3
"Pa. Statutes,.1913, P. L 396, sec. 6.
For instance, quite a wide power is given in the Child Labor Law, Pa.
Statutes, igS, P. L 286, sec. 5, paragraph 4, as follows: "In addition to the
foregoing, it shall be unlawful for any minor under eighteen years of age to
be employed or permitted to work in any other occupation dangerous to life
or limb, or injurious to the health or morals of said minor, as such occupa-
tions shall, from time to time, after public hearings thereon, be determined
and declared by the Industrial Board. . .
Another example is in the Woman's Act, Pa. Statutes, x91j, P. L 709,
amending the Act of 1913, P. L o24, which provides in Section 3, Para-
graph a: "That the one day of holiday in seven may be subdivided into two
days of twelve hours each, for women employes in hotels, boarding houses.
and in charitable, educational and religious institutions, at the discretion of
the Industrial Board." .
In this connection, see also the following statutes:
(x) The Act of 1917 ', P. L 186, which is a supplement to the Woman's
Act of 1913, provides that the Industrial Board may modify the provisions
of the Woman's Act of 1913, P. L 1o24, with certain exceptions, one of which
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2. ORDERS, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL
BOARD..
In pursuance of the power conferred by the legislature, the
Industrial Board has made many orders, rules and regulations,
of which may be mentioned some thirty-odd rulings relating to
the Child Labor Law, over twenty rulings relating to women in
industry and about twenty-five Safety Standards or Safety
Codes, which are codifications of safety rules applying to a sin-
gle industry or occupation; besides a number of separate or indi-
vidual rulings applying to specific conditions. We may divide
these administrative orders and rulings of the Industrial Board
into two groups, calling them, (a) Executive orders and (b)
Legislative orders.
(a) Executive Orders.
Executive orders may be defined as specific rules or orders
directing a particular person to do or refrain from doing some
act in order to enforce compliance with existing law, whether
made by the legislature or by the administrative body in pursu-
ance of delegated power. An example would be an order to the
X Company that they limii the number of employees in a room,
so that there be 3oo cubic feet of air space for each employee.
These executive orders in Pennsylvania may be issued by the
Commissioner of Labor and Industry or by the Industrial Board.
The source of the order does not qualify its legal effect, if it is
an "official" order.
is that the maximum hours of labor may not be increased. Hearings are
provided for upon the proper petition being filed for such modification. Of
course, the modification is not to be injurious to the health or welfare of the
females affected. Appeals from such modifications as the Board orders, may
be made to the Industrial Board itself or to the courts.
(2) Pa. Statutes, 1917: P. L T63, relating to moving pictures; in Section
3, the Industrial Board is given power to modify requirements specified in
the Act, if by so doing the purpose of the Act will be best accomplished. The
Bulletin of the Industrial Board for August, 1921, p. 4, gives the following
example of this provision at work: the Motion Picture Owners of Pennsyl-
vania petitioned the Board for permission to employ females between ages
of 16 and 21 after 9 P. M. in Motion Picture Theatres. The Board denied
the petition, since there was no emergency to justify a variation from the
law.
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The validity of these executive orders may be questioned by
the courts, first, in prosecutions for violation of the order, sec-
ondly, in civil suits for damages where an order has not been
complied with, or thirdly, in direct proceedings, as injunction,
which question the legality of the order. In the discussion under
Inspection, supra, it was seen that in criminal prosecutions, par-
ticularly in New York, the courts will try to persuade defendants
to comply with the executive order by giving them a second
chance. This may be a matter of judicial discretion, but it does
not give to an executive order the authority to which it is entitled.
When an executive order is attacked directly, the only ques-
tion is whether the order is "reasonable." In the case of Roum-
fort Co. v. Delaney, 46 already referred to, orders were issued by
the Chief Factory Inspector to the corporation requiring it to
make such alterations and changes in its place of business as
would fully meet the requirements of the Fire and Panic Act of
i909. An injunction was asked for, the constitutionality of the
Act being attacked, but the Supreme Court upheld the act and
applied the standard of "reasonableness" to the executive order
in question. In the words of the Court:
"It is true the act might be enforced in such an arbitrary man-
ner as to work hardship and do great injustice in some instances,
but nothing of this appears in the present case. It will be presumed
that officers entrusted with its enforcement will only require such
reasonable compliance as the exigencies of each particular case
demand."
In the case of Cockroft v. Mitchell, 47 the plaintiff was the
owner of a sixteen-story building used principally by manufac-
turing jewelers with an occupancy of over 6oo persons, the loca-
tion being in a busy down-town section of New York. Its sole
interior stairway used as a means of exit was not enclosed with
fire-resisting materials, nor was there any exit conforming to
the requirements of Section 79-b of the Labor Law of New
230 Pa. 37 (1911).
4 Cockroft v. Mitchell et al, composing the Industrial Commission of
New York, 187 App. Div. (N. Y.) 19o (xgig), affirming judgment on the
opinion of Ganevin, J., at Special Term, reported in ioz N. Y. Misc. 2!!
(1917).
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York. The Industrial Commission issued orders requiring the
plaintiff to provide additional means of exit on each floor of the
building remote from the existing exit and to enclose all interior
stairways with partitions of fire-resisting material. The plaintiff
brought an action to review the decision of the Industrial Com-
mission, attacking the constitutionality of the Labor Law, Sec-
tion 79-b. The Court upheld the section in* question and held
that the orders of the Industrial Commission were reasonable
and necessary to carry out the law, in the following language:
"9The law being upheld as constitutional, it becomes necessary to
consider whether the orders involved are valid and reasonable."The evidence shows that the building . . . is not equipped
in accordance with the statutory requirements for factory buildings.
The State Industrial Commission is a legally constituted body, clothed
with certain delegated legislative powers. Under the plain wording
of the statute, which applies to all buildings used for factory pur-
poses, there can be no question but that said Commission had juris-
diction of the subject matter and was acting well within the scope of
its authority in issuing the orders complained of. The plaintiff's
argument that the orders are invalid, does not call for serious refuta-
tion unless, indeed, it be based on the claim that they are unreason-
able, which must in turn be proved by a fair preponderance of the
-evidence.
"The reasonableness of the orders depends on the answer to the
question, 'Is the building safe from the danger of panic.' The undis-
puted facts all point to the same conclusion and that conclusion, to
my mind, is that the building is unsafe. . . Further, compliance
with the orders of the Commission will make the building reasonably
safe under the circumstances. . .. The expenditure necessary to
comply with these orders is neither confiscatory or unreasonable,'
(b) Legislative Orders.
If executive orders are ,propirly judged by their reason-
ableness, it seems that legislative orders should be given at least
the same consideration. Legislative orders may be defined as
general rules and regulations made by administrative officers
in pursuance of authority delegated by the legislature. This is
really law-making, and conforms to Cooley's definition of a
legislative act as "a pre-determination of what the law shall be
'See also Scheier v. Mitchell, 188 App. Div. (N. Y.) x82 (91T); Helinev. Great Western Milling Co., x85 Pac. (Cal.) Sio (1919).
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for the regulation of all future cases falling under its provi-
sions." 41
A consideration of the procedure of the Industrial Board
in making these legislative orders will illustrate that it is law-
making. A ruling is al .vays based on a petition to the Board by
employer, employee or any interested party. The Board, after
passing on the petition may promulgate a ruling, applying the
law to the specific conditions. These tentative rulings are then
submitted at a public hearing to all persons interested, when they
are criticized and modified to satisfy conflicting demands, if pos-
sible. For example, in the Bulletin of the Industrial Board (Pa.)
for January, 1921, there are some six tentative rulings printedL
One of them applies to Safety Standards and is an additional
rule fitting into one of the Safety Codes. It reads thus:
MOULDING AND MIrXING MACHINES IN BAKERIES. "Rule 130
(n) (A-i). The practice of removing dough from, or the cleaning
of moulding and mixing machines while in operation, is prohibited."
'Another tentative ruling applies to minors, as follows:
MOULDING AND MIXING MACHINES IN BAKEIEs. "Rule M-3 2.
That minors under eighteen years of age shall not be permitted to
operate moulding and mixing machines in bakeries."
These particular rulings were originally submitted to the
Industrial Board early in December, copies of them were then
sent to persons interested in the baking industry for criticism,
and they were finally adopted on January 25, 1921. Thereafter
a violation of the ruling becomes a misdemeanor. Similarly
when the Industrial Board formulated pre-existing practise in the
manufacture of explosives and ruled that "no person in a pow-
der mill shall carry or have upon his pers6n matches, . .
or contrivances for lighting," it made any employee, violating the
rule, not only subject to discharge, but liable to fine or imprison-
ment.
Even more closely resembling legislative action is the formu-
lation of safety standards or safety codes, a field in which Penn-
sylvania has been a leader. In making a safety code, the Indus-
'Cooley, Constitutional Unitations, p. rio.
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trial Board, after deciding upon the nature of the subject mat-
ter of the proposed code, as elevators, bake-shops, head and eye
protection, explosives, etc., selects a representative committee of
persons interested. The committee to draw up the elevator code
contained representatives of the elevator manufacturer, the ele-
vator owner, the installer, the user, the operator and the insurer.
This committee selected a subcommittee to submit a first draft,
which was then criticized by the whole committee, after which a
tentative draft was made. This tentative draft was then pub-
lished, and public hearings were held to discuss it in five or six
places in the state, for a period of months. After a final
draft had been made, it was submitted to the Industrial Board for
adoption, Whereupion it has the force and effect of law, with this
advantage over statutory law, that a ruling of the Industrial
Board can be changed or withdrawn at any time to conform with
changing conditions of industry.
This discussion of the actual workings of the Industrial
Board should be sufficient to justify the use of the word "legis-
lative" as applied.to the Board's general rulings and safety
standards. Mr. John R. Commons says that this work of inves-
tigation and research is what entitles an administrative body, like
an Industrial Board, to its jositon ls a fourth branch of govern-
ment; that the true administrative function is "constructive inves-
tigation." So
The validity of these legislative orders, when attacked in the
courts, depends, in the first place, on the constitutionality of the
statute involved. For the most part the courts will uphold pres-
ent labor legishtion, except in those cases where the legislature
has acted arbitrarily or capriciously. There is now a large body
of precedent behind these laws, as can be seen in the cases up-
holding workmen's compensation acts,51 and, in general, cases
" Commons, Labor and Administration, Chapter 22.
Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, Chap 9.
"Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 225 Pa. 33 (916); In re Opinions of
Justices, 2o9 Mass. 6D7 ('i9"); State ex reL. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 6S
Wash. 156 (i'g'); Borgms v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327 (9z); State ex rel
Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349 (1912); Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co.,
215 N, Y. 514 (1915); Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 151 Pac. (Cal.)
398 (11s).
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upholding laws which provide for the safety and health of em-
ployees, for the inspection of factories, etc.52  The prevailing
tendency of the courts is illustrated by the line of cases involv-
ing the constitutionality of statutes fixing hours of labor. For a
valuable study of this, reference should be made to an article by
Mr. Felix Frankfurter, 53 which shows that the courts, adher-
ing to the test of reasonableness, have come more and more to
look at these labor laws in the "light of a realistic study of the
industrial conditions affected." "4
Of course, the courts will not uphold a law which leaves
untrammelled discretion to the administrative body,5 5 but if the
legislature provides some standard and delegates to a commis-
sion the power of making rules in accordance therewith, the
courts will generally sustain the law.5" As the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has said:
"What is more common than to *appoint commissioners under a
law to determine things upon decision of which the act is to operate
in one way or another?' The legislature cannot delegate its power to
"Arms v. Ayer, x92 Ill. 6or (igoi); Roumfort Co. v. Delaney, 23o Pa.
(i9II); Cockroft v. Mitchell, 187 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1gO (i959)- Rail
and River Coal Co. v. Yaple ef al.t, constituting the Industrial Commission of
Ohio, 236 U. S. 38 094).
"Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29
Harvard Law Review 353. See cases cited, particularly; Wfolden v. Hardy,
169 U. S. 395 (ixg), upholding the constitutionality of an eight-hour law
for men who work in mines; Mueller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S. 42o (spoS), up-
holding the Oregon ten-hour law for women; Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 IlL
5o9 (ipso), upholding a similar ten-hour law for women in Illinois; People
v. Chas. Schweinler Press, 2r4 N. Y. 395 (i9gs), upholding a law prohbiting
night work for women in industry; State v. Bunting, 71 Ore. 259 (xPI4), up-
holding a ten-hour law for adult males in factories.
" 29 Harvard Law Rev. 353, 366.
"Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, 135 CaL 466 (i9o2); People v. Klinck Packing
Co., 214 N. Y. 121 (1piS).
" Com. v. Falk, 59 Pa. Super. 217 (1915), upholding the constitutionality
of the State Live-Stock Sanitary Board; Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio Industrial
Commission, 236 U. S. 230 (ixis), upholding moving-picture censorship; In-
termountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (z9r4), upholding the power of the
Interstate Commerce Commission under the long and short haul clause. See
also other cases under the Interstate Commerce Act; for cases upholding the
power of public utilty boards and commissions, see, inter alid: Connecticut
Co. v. City of Norwalk, 89 Conn. 58 (i9rS); Alton and Southern Railway
Co. v. Vandalia Railway Co., 268 11. 68 (i915) ; Hocking Valley Railway
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 9 Ohio St. 9 (19x1).
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make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to
make its own action depend."'
Granted the constitutionality of the statute involved, the
validity of a legislative order depends finally on the reasonable-
ness of the order itself. That this is also the proper test to apply
to general rulings and safety standards of the Industrial Board,
seems to follow by analogy from cases involving the fixing of
rates. Relative to rate-nitking, the courts are nearly unanimous
in holding that they cannot interfere unless confiscation is shown,
and that unreasonableness, used in a constitutional sense, .means
confiscatory.58 In the case of the Louisville and Nashville Rail-
road Co. v. Garrett,59 Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the
court, said:
"The rate making power necessarily implies a range of legis-
lative discretion. . . The appropriate questions for the courts
would be whether the Commission acted within the authority duly con-
ferred by the legislature, and also, . . . whether the Commission
violated the constitutional rights of property by imposing confisca-
tory requirements."
Similar considerations should guide the courts in passing
on orders, for instance, which fix a minimum wage In'Stettler
v. O'Hara, 0 the Oregon statute provided that it shall be unlaw-
ful to employ women or minors for unreasonably long hours or
- in unsanitary surroundings or for inadequate wages, and cre-
ated the Industrial Welfare Commission to ascertain standards
of hours of employment and of minimum wages. The Com-
mission made an order limiting hours of labor of women em-
=IX re LDcke's Appeal 72 Pa. 498 (1872).
u=Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas CO, 212 U. S. 19,41 (109o); Atlantic Coast
lane Co. v. N. Car. Corporation Commission, 2o6 U. S. i (z9o7); C. B. & Q.
Railroad Co. v. Babcoc% 2a4 U. S. 585, 598 (1907); Railroad Co. v. Min-
nesota, io U. S. 257, 266 (192) ; San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 174
U. S. 739, 754, 759 (1899); San Diego Land Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439
(1903); Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. I (J9og); Minnesota
Rate Cases, 23o U. S. 352, 433 (1913).
231 U. S. 298, 313 (1913).
"Stettler v. O'Hara et al., constituting the Industrial Welfare Commis-
sion of Oregon, 69 Ore. 5T9 (1914), affirmed without opinion by evenly
divided court in 243 U. S. 629 (1917).
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ployed in the city of Portland to nine hours a day and fixing a
minimum wage. In a suit to annul this order, the court held
that the statute fixing maximum hours of labor and minimum
wages for women and children was within the police power of
the state, and was constitutional. In holding that the order of
the Commission, although the statute provided that it be conclu-
sive as to all questions of fact, was not a violation of due process,
the court said:
"Thus in the present case, the plaintiff was given the right and
opportunity to be heard before the Commission. Reasonable notice
and fair opportunity to be heard before some tribunal before it de-
cides the issues, are the essentials of due process. The- party ag-
grieved is not without remedy as to matter that would be the appro-
priate subject of judicial inquiry, namely (referring to L. & N. Rail-
road Co. v. Garrett) ii the rates fixed are confiscatory." 1
In State v. Lange Canning Company,6 2 in the second opin-
ion filed in the case, the court held as follows:
"Ve are of the opinion that the statute may properly be con-
strued as laying down the general rule that women shall not be per-
mitted to work in any place for such a period of time as shall be
prejudicial to their health, and, authorizing the Industrial Commission
upon investigation to determine as a fact'what classes of employment
are dangerous or prejudicial to the life, health, safety and welfare
of such females, and to establish by general orders such classifica-
tion and the time which females may labor therein; and we are of
opinion that, so contrued and to that extent, the law should be upheld,
for the reason that the authority thus conferred invests the Commis-
sion with no arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion, but directs them to
ascertain the facts and to apply the rules of law thereto under the
prescribed terms and conditions." 63
In conclusion, fixing reasonable hours for labor and rea-
sonable conditions of employment is analogous to fixing reasona-
ble rates, rules and practices for public service corporations and to
"69 Ore. 519, s4o.
a x64 Wis. 228 (igx6).
"In American Woodenware Manufacturing Co. v. Schorling, 1t7 N. E.
(Ohio) 366 (1917), the court said: "An order made by the Industrial
Commission to employers generally or to a particular employer, with refer-
ence to safe employment or place of employment, is a 'lawful requirement,'
for failure to comply with which the employer is liable."
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deciding other questions as to which the legislature may have de-
termined the general policy and rule, leaving its application and
enforcement to an administrative tribunal. In such cases, courts
only interfere where an administrative body acts beyond the
scope of its authority or has abused its discretion. Neither legis-
lature nor commission can confiscate property under the guise of
regulation, and, in such cases, courts have power to declare void
a confiscatory law or order made thereunder. Whether the
legislature acts directly, naming a freight rate, for instance, or
a particular minimum wage for women, or maximum hours of
labor, or whether the legislature adopts general rules and dele-
gates the power to determine the specific rate or wage, the re.
suit is the same: the ultimate act is legislative. The commission-
ers' determination, stands on the same plane as a direct enact-
ment of the legislature. The rate of wage or conditions of em-
ployment fixed by the Commission become a part of the law, and
the only inquiry open to the courts is whether the order was
regularly made, duly served and whether any constitutional rights
have been violated. Has the commission, under the guise of
regulation, acted so arbitrarily as to abuse its discretion or other-
wise acted beyond the scope of its authority?
Mr. John R. Commons, speaking of the Wisconsin Indus.
trial Commission, puts the situation as follows:"
"We have to provide regulations which, according to the courts,
shall be reasonable. This word 'reasonable' is the only loophole we
have to enable us to slip by the courts. So we get strong manufac-
turers, representing those who would be likely to test our provisions.
in the courts, to assist in drawing up the rules. Public hearings are
held on preliminary recommendations and the rulings are satisfactory
before they are issued by the 'ommission. If the names of these
manufacturers are back of the rules and orders of the commission,
nobody can say they are unreasonable and no employer can afford to
go against them."
This may help explain the fact that up to the present, the
courts have not attacked any of the rulings or codes of the In.
dustrial Board of Pennsylvania, and why the present Commis-
3 American Labor Legislation Review z2.
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sioner insists that the important thing behind these rulings is the
"prerogative" of the Board."
"Reasonableness" is a legal standard with a variable con-
tent, depending for its meaning on the civilization of the time
and place. We cannot define it accurately. In rate cases, it is
referred to confiscation. In labor legislation, "reasonableness is
as complicated as human life and modern industry." 68 Perhaps
we may say, following a suggestion made by Mr. Frankfurter,
that in labor cases, "reasonableness" presupposes that behind any
order or ruling there shall be a substantiality of evidence.
Robert H. Wettach,
University of North Carolina School of Law.
Perhaps the Commissioner, Mr. Clifford B. Connelly, used 'preroga-
tive" in the sense of "prestige."
" Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (Ed. 2), 479.
